The Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) has proposed widening the Capital Beltway (I-495) in Virginia between Springfield (I-95) and the American Legion Bridge to 12 lanes. Despite the efforts of thousands of Fairfax County residents to encourage the study of rail alternatives that would minimize the disruption of communities affected by such a widening, there has yet to be completed an in-depth study of any specific heavy (e.g., MetroRail) or light rail options that would facilitate movement of people in the Beltway Corridor. This omission is particularly glaring in the face of VDOT’s own projection of continued gridlock on this portion of the Beltway even after completion of a 12-lane widening. This White Paper is a citizen-generated option that the Fairfax Coalition for Smart Growth, Inc. believes needs to be given serious discussion and analysis by the community, our elected representatives, and the Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation (DRPT) before further tax dollars are spent in designing a 12-lane Beltway that will be congested the day it is opened.

The Coalition’s light rail option calls initially for a 12-mile system double tracked from Tysons Corner to Dunn Loring and a single tracked system from Dunn Loring to Springfield. Station stops will include Springfield Mall, Old Downtown Springfield, North Springfield, Ravensworth-Wakefield, Annandale-NVCC-Route 236, Fairfax Hospital-Exxon-Mobil, Yorktowne Plaza-Route 50, Merrifield-Route 29, Dunn Loring Metro Station, Dunn Loring Post Office-Cedar Lane, Old Court House Road, and Tysons Corner. The line could possibly incorporate right-of-way under Virginia Power’s transmission lines from the Gallows Road/Fairview Office Park area to Springfield. The system will serve as a catalyst for economic development by implementing the Smart Growth principle of concentrating mixed use multi-family and commercial development near transit stops, resulting in less development pressure on single family neighborhoods and preserving open space. Each of the transit stops becomes a destination in itself, no longer requiring people to use their cars to get to the stops.

The proposed line will have eight trains per hour, arriving every 7 ½ minutes during peak hours, 15-minute intervals during the day and on Saturdays, and 20-minute intervals from 7 pm to midnight and on Sundays, with no service between midnight and 5 am. A fleet of 28 cars and 140 permanent employees will be needed to handle the 28,176 daily passengers on the system. At $25 million per mile construction cost for essentially an at-grade system, its total cost will be $300 million. If the system were extended to the American Legion Bridge as part of an overall Beltway light rail system connecting Tysons with Bethesda ( a total distance of 18 miles in Virginia), the estimated cost will be $450 million. Annual operating expenses for the initial 28-car Tysons-to-Springfield section are $14 million.

This capital investment of full 18-mile route can be financed from several sources. First, based on the 62½% rate that the Federal Transit Administration funds MetroRail, this would mean $281 million from the federal grants, leaving $169 million to be funded by a combination of state and local sources. For instance, half of this ($84.5 million) represents only 21% of the $400 million in contributions Gov. Gilmore proposed spending annually on transportation projects as part of his overall five-year, $2.6 billion Northern Virginia transportation funding package. The remaining $84.5 million could be paid over four years at $21 million per year from revenue bonds. These bonds, as well as the estimated annual operating deficit of $3.7 million (i.e., at least 40% fare box recovery), can be funded by real estate, property, and business and professional taxes resulting from the increased property values, business activities, and gross sales that businesses and multi-family units located in proximity to light rail stops generate.

If Northern Virginia’s experience with Metro Orange Line is any indicator, Fairfax County will benefit from an annual 19% return on its capital investment in transit and a lowering of the overall county real estate tax rate by 42%. Likewise, if experience in other cities (e.g., San Diego, Portland, OR) that have introduced light rail systems is repeated, bus ridership actually will increase by as much as 60%. By costing 82% less ($25 million per mile to construct vs $145 million per mile for the recently proposed Blue line extension to Largo) and at least 40% firebox cost recovery, light rail is clearly the most cost-effective transit alternative for the Beltway Corridor. When these costs are combined with a superior safety record -- 80% lower fatality rate than autos, 63% fewer collisions than buses, 48% fewer injuries than buses, the prospects of actually removing vehicles from our highways, and less vehicular generated air pollution, the case for light rail becomes overwhelming.

With the equivalent of 14,088 different individuals each day using the Tysons-to-Springfield line daily and an estimated 80% using the system for work trips, the light rail line will be serving 11,270 jobs in the vicinity of the route. At 300 square feet of office space per person, this equates to 3.4 million square feet of office space that will be served by this line. Service connecting to Maryland would approximately double this total. In addition, new businesses seeking accessibility to their offices for their employees increasingly will seek locations served by the light rail system, rather than going further out into exurbia and increasing their employees’ commute and decreasing their access to the job market and the amenities of urban life. Although by no means will all work-related trips be new workers employed by new businesses, at $150 per square foot to construct office space, the new light rail line could eventually account for $570 million worth of office space that will pay $7 million per year in local real estate taxes alone.

With adjacent properties expected to increase in value sufficiently to offset the light rail system’s costs, this will enable payment for the new line to be made out of increased tax revenues generated by the light rail system without an increase in the County’s real estate property tax. In fact, it is expected that the taxes generated by the increase property values will more than offset the cost of subsidy to light rail and the added costs to deliver county services and actually will result in decreased property taxes rates in Fairfax County. This would be consistent with the significant property tax rate reductions that accompanied MetroRail extension into Arlington and Fairfax counties that were explained earlier in this paper. This would allow Fairfax County to avoid having to construct four new Beltway lanes and numerous access roads at a cost of $2.0 billion dollars and untold costs on adjacent neighborhoods and the environment.

The purpose of this White Paper is to illustrate a light rail solution to traffic congestion, air pollution, and safety problems on two segments of the Capital Beltway (I-495) in Virginia: Tysons Corner to Springfield and Tysons Corner to the Cabin John Bridge. This White Paper will focus on the Beltway Corridor in a manner similar to the study done by the Maryland Department of Transportation (MDOT) in studies of its transit options for relieving Beltway congestion, namely, considering the Beltway Corridor as a general corridor that may extend a mile or two on either side of the existing Beltway right-of-way, not limited to only that land area presently included within the current right-of-way. The overriding objectives are to move people safely and effectively, not just move vehicles, as a means of connecting all types of people, including those who may not have access to a vehicle, with their origins and destinations and to use the light rail system as an economic catalyst to attract investment near its station stops, to concentrate development, and to relieve pressure for more sprawl and the elimination of more green spaces.

Various Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments (COG) and other transportation studies have determined that there are approximately 200,000 vehicles per day carrying 240,000 persons traveling in both directions on the Springfield-to-American Legion segment of the Virginia portion of the Capital Beltway. This represents an average of 1.15 persons per vehicle, excluding a very few interstate and commuter buses which carry a miniscule ridership compared to the total. During the three-hour peak commuter periods at both ends of the workday, it has been estimated there are an average of 10,000 vehicles during the morning and evening rush hours traveling this segment in both directions. The predominant traffic flow, however, is toward Tysons Corner (on the inner loop from the south and on the outer loop from the north) in the morning, with backups at times extending beyond Braddock Road, and from Tysons Corner with backups extending well into Maryland around the Beltway and up to I-270 near Montgomery Mall.

With Level of Service (LOS) "F" capacity of vehicles per hour at 1,250 observed on the nearby I-66 interstate highway, the existing four lanes in each direction can move 5,000 vehicles per hour in each direction. This means that four lanes can move 15,000 vehicles in one direction over the course of a three-hour peak period, or 16,500 passengers based upon 1.15 occupants per peak vehicle. Unfortunately, there is only anecdotal evidence on the specific origins and destinations of these vehicles. There is data on egress and access at the various interchanges at various times of the day, but no detailed origin-destination studies have been undertaken by either COG or VDOT at these interchanges.

An overall MetroRail passenger-mile per line-mile ridership projection (i.e., the number of passengers who would pass a given point on the line during a specific unit of time) for the circumferential segment (excluding Franconia to Springfield to King Street in Alexandria) is already available, with 14,300 to 14,500 passengers daily in both directions calculated by JHK and Parsons-Brinkerhoff, respectively. This is calculated by (1) multiplying each station-to-station link (i.e., the number of people on a train riding between each pair of stations times the number of miles between each station pair added together to get total passenger miles for the overall route), and (2) dividing this figure by the entire length of the line. It was estimated the Tysons Corner-to-Dulles Access Road segment would carry 22,524 to 25,377 passengers per weekday presently using cars. This would amount to about 11 percent of the total highway plus transit movement on an all-day basis. For the congested peak periods, transit would carry 7,185 passengers in both the morning and afternoon rush hours – equivalent to 29 percent of the traffic.

For light rail with 2,634 passengers one-way during per peak hour will require a three-car train every 7 ½ minutes, which equals 31 percent, or 5,750 (5,000 x 1.15 persons per car), of the total movement at capacity of the highway at LOS "F". The light rail plan will add 46.5 percent to the people-moving capacity of the corridor with a margin to spare should travel exceed the estimate. This is calculated to equal 5,000 automobiles one-way in the peak hour. Although 2,000 automobiles per hour is the free-flowing safe capacity for a freeway lane, a congested freeway lane can move only 1,250 per hour.

For comparative purposes, on I-66 west of Ballston, over half of the peak hour travel in the predominant direction is on MetroRail, and less than 50% is in automobiles. On the other hand, on the Beltway, when it matters most in peak hours, the transit modal split is estimated at 114 % of the existing (year 2000) highway lane capacity with free flow calculated as follows: 2,634 divided by 2,000 x 1.15. Transit is estimated to carry 183% of the LOS "F" freeway lane capacity calculated in the following manner: 2,634 divided by 1,250 x 1.15. At 2,634 rail passengers one-way during the peak hour, transit travel volume is equal to two lanes of highway travel in each direction at LOS "F" or "G". For the return direction, an additional two lanes would otherwise be required without transit.

By comparison, the capacity of the various rail modes is 15,000 passengers per hour one-way for light rail and 30,000 per hour one-way for Rail Rapid Transit (heavy rail) such as MetroRail. It is important to note that there is no need to approach capacity as the basis for economic justification of the route any more than there is a need for a fully loaded highway before one is built.

In conducting its Major Investment Study (MIS) in preparation for its 12-lane Beltway Widening Proposal, Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) alleges (without sharing its assumptions or calculations with the public) that its consultants (JHK, now part of SAIC, and Parsons-Brinkerhoff) computer modeling results show that rail transit would relieve only 3% of the Beltway traffic. Not only is VDOT not the recognized authority on public mass transit in Virginia (the Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation is), but two national transportation consulting firms, Parsons-Brinkerhoff and JHK, did studies attempting to predict how many passengers would be likely to use a transit system constructed parallel to the Beltway. They concluded that at the busiest point on the line, ridership would be 23,950 riders throughout the day in both directions in the Tysons Corner area. According to their figures, about 2,600 passengers would ride one-way in the peak hour. This would allow Fairfax County to avoid having to construct two new Beltway lanes and to avoid having to add four lanes of access road widening in each direction.

Limited efforts have been initiated by Fairfax County to address traffic congestion on the outer loop north of Tysons Corner. The principal one has been the SmartMover MetroBus service (Route 14) originating in both Bethesda and Montgomery Village and terminating at Tysons Corner West Park. Inaugurated in 1998, this express bus service on the Beltway attracted an average of only 600 weekday passengers throughout the day in 1999 (i.e., 300 passengers in each direction). It has no intermediate stops for less than full-length trips and requires a transfer at West Park to reach most of Tysons Corner. The local congestion the buses encounter just getting to West Park, however, causes many missed connections. VDOT officials do not believe it safe for buses to travel on the Beltway "breakdown" lane to bypass congestion. Therefore, when the Beltway is tied up, SmartMover buses are tied up as well.

It is estimated by the authors that the SmartMover buses on Route 14 are costing almost $3 million annually to operate, with fare collections of only $150,000 per year, for a revenue-to-cost ratio of 5.5% and equal to a subsidy of $18.83 for each dollar of fare. Each SmartMover bus serves about 40 passengers per day, but MetroBus elsewhere averages 350 passengers per bus per day and still loses huge sums of money, when compared with MetroRail where losses are minimal. On the Shirley Highway HOV express bus lanes, with higher fares, buses average 106 passengers per day bus lose money even faster. Among the reasons for this poor performance are the lack of intermediate stops en route, the need to transfer with long waits, unclear routing of the buses, and circuitous routing through suburban neighborhoods.

For each Northern Virginia bus passenger throughout the system, including riders of the Fairfax Connector, there is currently a $2.00 subsidy. Cities with "successful" bus systems, like Houston and Seattle, need a $3.00 subsidy for each dollar of fare to maintain service but have a 1% transit sales tax to support the huge cost. Neither Northern Virginia nor Fairfax County have such a tax to support costly bus service. In contrast, MetroRail riders need only a 67-cent subsidy for each dollar of fare. It appears safe to assume that existing SmartMover service will be jeopardized if the losses continue unabated and the projected 16 percent revenue-to-cost ratio is not met.

Almost a decade ago, VDOT conducted a sophisticated computerized study of an express bus grid system for Northern Virginia focusing on the Capital Beltway, but the number of passengers per trip was so low that the idea was rejected. The express buses on Shirley Highway HOV express lanes (I-395) lost 67% of their average annual ridership between the energy crisis of 1980 and the arrival of MetroRail in Springfield-Franconia in 1997, despite population growth in the area.

From a transportation planning standpoint, a Washington Post regional public opinion survey (reported December 9, 1995) sheds some light on the public’s preference for improved transit services. It found that 74% of residents in the National Capital area wanted more and better public mass transit, but only 58% wanted more or wider highways. About 32% wanted both. On the other hand, according to the Board of Trade, only 1 in 10 trips in the region is made by public transit, even though the National Capital area has the second highest rail transit ridership in the nation.

The reason for this low transit percentage, of course, is that our region includes hundreds of square miles of very low-density sprawl development that was built far from public transit to obtain low land prices and to satisfy the upwardly mobile family’s desire to get their own little estate in the country. In the heavily developed area of the city and its immediate suburbs, the use of MetroRail travel has been increasing faster than automobile travel, while the use of such automobile-oriented solutions to traffic congestion, such as HOVs, has been declining. This proves that when transit facilities are available along corridors with concentrated development, transit ridership grows. It also provides some useful insights as to how future growth and revitalization efforts in Fairfax County and adjoining jurisdictions need to occur. In short, there is a need for more high quality public mass transit, not less.

To update the Washington Post survey of December 9, 1995, the COG’s Transportation Planning Board (TRB) reported in its January TPB News that 37% of the citizens want improvement and expansion of the MetroRail system, 25% want road improvements, 16% prefer general public transit improvements, and 10% prefer buses. Twelve percent did not express a clear preference. In this survey, no double counting was permitted, but the ranking was the same as in the Washington Post’s earlier scientific public opinion poll taken in 1995.

Consultant studies have shown that a light rail line is needed on the Beltway or parallel to the Beltway from Branch Avenue in Prince George’s County to Temple Hills, Oxon Hill, and Alexandria, and from Silver Spring through Bethesda to Tysons Corner and Fairview Park at the Beltway and Route 50. These segments might someday be connected. Maryland Gov. Glendening’s proposed a "Purple Line" around the Beltway that would be a financial failure if it did not extend to Alexandria and Tysons Corner, two major employment centers. However, there is insufficient ridership for a heavy rail MetroRail line. As a perspective, light rail services in North America on private rights-of-way serve an average population density of 2,981 per square mile, while the Woodrow Wilson Bridge Corridor density is 3,629 (1990 census) -- 22% higher than the average. Similar densities prevail elsewhere along the Beltway Corridor in Northern Virginia. Therefore, to both alleviate the traffic congestion in the mornings and evenings between Springfield and the Cabin John Bridge, Del. David Albo R-Springfield) introduced legislation which was signed into law directing the VDRPT to study the feasibility of light rail from Springfield through Tysons Corner to Bethesda and Silver Spring. The results of this study are scheduled to be released in December 2000, although it appears that that Virginia’s Secretary of Transportation is refusing to comply with the General Assembly’s first or second action directing that this study be undertaken.

Based on the need to move over 6,000 persons one way in each direction during the peak three-hour commuter period, the Fairfax Coalition has determined that a double tracked light rail system from Tysons Corner to Dunn Loring and a single tracked system from Dunn Loring to Springfield could be developed initially from Springfield to Tysons Corner. (Exhibit 1) The trip length is about 12 miles with intermediate stops proposed at Springfield Mall, Old Downtown Springfield, North Springfield, Ravensworth-Wakefield, Annandale-NVCC-Route 236, Fairfax Hospital-Exxon-Mobil, Yorktowne Plaza-Route 50, Merrifield-Route 29, Dunn Loring Metro Station, Dunn Loring Post Office-Cedar Lane, and Old Court House Road.

Alternatively, the route could diverge from the Ravensworth/Wakefield station, utilize the electric utility right-of-way crossing Braddock Road a half mile further west on Braddock Road, then follow the power line to the Virginia Railway Express station and Old Downtown Springfield before continuing on to Springfield Mall and the Springfield-Franconia MetroRail station. The alignment might also benefit by using the power line right-of-way behind Lafayette Village just northeast of the intersection of the Beltway and Route 236 in Annandale before it reaches Gallows Road to proceed on Gallows Road to the Fairfax Hospital-Exxon-Mobil station. This alternative may need further refinement in order to determine how to best serve the Fairview Office Park complex located inside the Beltway at Route 50.

By configuring the light rail route in this manner, the system can more easily serve as a catalyst for economic development near each of the designation stops. This supports a fundamental Smart Growth principle of concentrating future development along or near such transit corridors to relieve multiple family housing and more dense townhouse development pressures in nearby single family residential neighborhoods. Moreover, each of the transit stops becomes a destination in itself, no longer requiring people to use their cars to get to the stops. For instance, employees working in Tysons Corner could meet their friends at a Yorktowne restaurant for lunch. Reverse MetroRail commuters working at Fairfax Hospital or Exxon-Mobil could easily use the light rail service to access MetroRail at the Dunn Loring Metro station to reach large segments of the region. Alexandria’s residents could use the Blue MetroRail line to access light rail to Tysons Corner without dealing with Beltway tie-ups. As with airline hubs, rail transit stations constitute centers of mobility in many directions by both bus and rail.

If light rail were needed to move the full 15,000 people per hour one-way, (an unlikely possibility), the peak hour train configuration would consist of four cars running every two minutes on double track, with 30 trains in the peak hour consisting of 120 cars in the prevailing direction. For the light rail ridership predicted by the consultants for the proposed line parallel to the Beltway, eight three-car trains would be necessary for the peak hour one-way with comfortable space for 3,000 passengers at 125 passengers per car, the majority of which would be

seated. During the three-hour peak period, the system might transport as many as 7,500 people one-way, as each hour will be less than the peak hour by the nature of commuters’ habits.

Normally, a light rail system will need 15% more rail cars than needed to meet its scheduling requirements as a few will always be in the shop for inspection, repair, and routine maintenance, and a few will be needed to rush into service to fill in for a delay. These are called "gap trains". With eight trains per hour, a train will arrive every 7 ½ minutes during peak hours, 15-minute intervals during the day and on Saturdays, and 20-minute intervals from 7 pm to midnight and on Sundays, with no service between midnight and 5 am. For an hour round trip between Springfield and Tysons Corner, with some recovery time at the end of each run, a fleet of 28 cars will be required, with additional cars for the run into Maryland. Other capital facilities needed will include a shop for maintenance and repair, perhaps located near the Norfolk Southern tracks used by the Virginia Railway Express. Light rail cars can be stored outdoors when not in use and not being serviced.

Personnel requirements for the 7 ½ minute service frequency will be about 140 employees, including train operators, station service people, maintenance workers, supervisors, and administrative personnel. These will be well-paying, permanent positions that cannot be "exported" to other areas of the nation or abroad. Light rail will be the equivalent of bringing a new business to Fairfax County with a $5 million annual payroll, including benefits. In turn, congestion-free light rail service will help attract new businesses as well as expand older businesses (e.g., Fairfax Hospital’s recently announced expansion) in the vicinity of the station stops with their additional payrolls and economic growth.

Our current bus service is essential but not attractive enough to help with our mobility problems. From 1980 to 1996, the Shirley Busway, as noted, had lost two-thirds of its Route 17 and 18 passengers in the Springfield area prior to the arrival of MetroRail in Springfield. Transit ridership increased over 475% in a few months after MetroRail service was opened to Springfield and was attributable solely to MetroRail’s extension. The positive impact that new rail service can have on the overall transit system, as well as on automobile usage in a particular corridor, already has been demonstrated along three corridors in Northern Virginia. In the first, as noted above on Route 18-Springfield, ridership had decreased to 2,350 weekday passengers by spring 1997. After MetroRail arrived in Springfield in June 1997, combined bus and MetroRail ridership increased 475% to 15,000 and system subsidies declined even as bus ridership further continued to its decline to 1,650 weekday passengers. A $7.00 per passenger subsidy has resulted to keep bus fares lower than MetroRail so as not to cause the bus line to be eliminated.

This was not an unusual occurrence. In 1986, when MetroRail came to Dunn Loring and Vienna as part of the Orange Line and constructed in the I-66 median, public transit (bus and MetroRail) use increased 900% over the previous express bus level of use in that corridor. The subsidy went down for both MetroBus and MetroRail.

The third significant example in Northern Virginia was the earlier construction of the Orange Line from Rosslyn to Ballston. By integrating Arlington County’s land use and transit planning, new economic development of the kind seen at Ballston, Virginia Square, Clarendon, and Court House Plaza was specifically directed on top of and within walking distance of the MetroRail stations. This has resulted in:

1. a return on the Commonwealth’s investment of over 19% annually projected to continue well into the 21^st Century;
2. Arlington County’s ability to reduce its real estate tax rate from $1.48 in 1975 to $0.86 in 1990 (a 40%+ drop), then a slow increase that accompanied the national real estate bust to $0.99 per $100 (in 2000 of assessed value) -- a 33% drop -- as the direct result of increased property values stemming from MetroRail’s station-related development. [Note: Fairfax County’s tax rate in 1975 decreased to $1.11 by 1989, down from $1.75 in 1975, or 35% from its pre-Metro levels, but has since crept up again to $1.23.];
3. Arlington’s County’s ability to pay its full share of MetroRail’s capital and operating costs out of increased revenue due to increased property values from dense commercial/residential development within walking distance of MetroRail stations – all the while relieving pressure for development in its family neighborhoods and expanding open space in communities in the rest of the County; and
4. movement of 6,800 persons one-way in one hour on and under a street (Fairfax Drive) that only had the capacity to move 1,700 cars per hour.

In 1999, there were two dozen North American metropolitan areas with light rail systems serving a total population of 7 ¼ million and carrying an estimated 390 million passengers annually over 1 ½ billion annual passenger miles in areas with an average population density of 2,982 people. Almost half of these systems are roughly analogous in system characteristics to Northern Virginia, including Baltimore, Calgary, Cleveland, Dallas, Delaware County (PA), Sacramento, San Diego, Santa Clara, and Salt Lake City. Another analogous system, Denver, will be operational by summer 2000 when it inaugurates service to the suburbs. In 2001, St. Louis, an even more analogous situation, institutes service to its low-density Illinois suburbs. [Note: refer to the accompanying light rail summary sheet for more details.]

A mathematical study using commute information contained in 1990 U.S. census found that in Sacramento light rail attracted 60-70% more riders than equivalent bus service attracted between suburb-to-suburb origins and destinations. In Sacramento, ridership on connecting buses actually increased 60% from 1986 to 1992 with modest increases continuing ever since. Also, even with a modest fare increase, revenue has increased 98% and the cost of moving passengers by light rail has proven to be 29% less per passenger-mile than the cost of bus service.

San Diego’s 47-mile system carries a total annual ridership of 24.6 million people, which is 32% of all area transit passengers. The rail portion only employs 24% of the workforce needed to provide all transit services, which is indicative of its cost-effectiveness relative to bus service. From the inception of the light rail system in 1981 through 2000, San Diego’s population has grown by 2½ % per year, or 50% over the 19-year period, while light rail ridership increased 556%, or 128% per route-mile over this period. All transit in San Diego increased its market share from 30 annual rides per capita in 1981 to 45 annual rides per capita in 1999 – an increase of 50% despite a growing rate of automobile ownership in the area. The cost of operating the San Diego Trolley, Inc. system in 1997 was 19 cents per passenger-mile, whereas bus operating costs were 37 cents per passenger-mile, or almost twice as high as that for trolleys. Despite this, San Diego bus costs were 31½ % below the national average urban bus cost of 54 cents per passenger mile -- again underlining the economy of light rail.

Construction Costs

The initial segment of the at-grade light rail line from Tysons to Springfield will be 12 miles. The second phase extending the route to the American Legion Bridge for connection a Maryland light rail system to Bethesda will increase the line to 18 miles. Light rail at-grade construction over the relatively flat terrain along this route is estimated at $23 million per mile, including rail cars and shops based upon the experience in Denver, Salt Lake City, and Saint Clair County, Illinois (St. Louis suburb). Using a round estimate of $25 million per mile, the complete finished construction and acquisition cost for the initial segment is estimated to cost $300 million and the complete 18-mile system will cost $450 million.

Recent information provided by LTK Engineering Services summarizes 10 of the completely new systems of the 21 that present operate in U.S. cities. (Exhibit 2) These ten include such successful systems as Portland (OR), Sacramento, St. Louis, and San Diego. As noted in the chart, light rail transit projects can vary widely, depending upon the extent and complexity of construction. A few projects located on old railroad or similarly available alignments have been built for approximately $15 million (in 2000 dollars) per mile, e.g., the original Baltimore and San Diego systems and the Sacramento extension. Alternatively, a few projects with extensive tunneling or other major infrastructure requirement can exceed $50 million per mile, as in Los Angeles. The average investment, in year 2000 dollars, is $22 million per mile, complete with cars, maintenance shops, and station platforms but excluding major subway construction.

For comparative purposes and because published figures have not been compiled for Northern Virginia by VDOT or the Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation (DRPT), the authors were compelled to use estimates developed by MDOT. MDOT has compiled estimates of $15-$30 million per mile for construction of HOV lanes, with these costs varying based on complexity of construction. MDOT further estimates that rail transit capital investment can vary from $25-$50 million per mile for at-grade light rail transit with minimal

impact on surrounding neighborhoods and business districts to $150-$300 million per mile for heavy rail transit (e.g., MetroRail) on structures or through tunnels. Heavy rail generally consists of a rail system on exclusive right-of-way with total grade separation, including viaducts and tunnels, whereas light rail generally consists of a rail system only partially on exclusive rights-of-way, with segments of shared right-of-way to allow much less costly construction and smaller, less expensive stations.

In the National Capital Region, Maryland’s Gov. Glendening announced on January 17, 2000, that the first official extension of the original 103-mile MetroRail system was being budgeted. This extension would add three more miles to the Blue Line, extending it to Summerfield and Largo by 2004 for an investment of $434 million, or $145 million per mile. For comparison purposes, if the same per mile MetroRail cost were applied to the 18-mile Springfield-to-American Legion Bridge segment, that segment would cost $2.6 billion.

As point of reference, the recently adopted 2020 Transportation Plan for Northern Virginia seeks $2.8 billion for all transit projects through 2010 and another $3.9 billion from 2011 to 2020. Even with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) contributing 62½ % of the investment, as Gov. Glendening’s budget forecasts, a Beltway MetroRail project potentially could siphon off $1.9 billion from all the available transit funds through 2010, equal to 68% of the total. This would be the equivalent of almost five years worth of Gov. Gilmore’s $400 million annual contribution for all Northern Virginia’s transportation projects proposed in August 1999 as part of his $2.5 billion transportation funding package for Northern Virginia. Thus, at 3-4 times the cost of a light rail system essentially constructed at-grade, MetroRail is not a viable alternative for addressing the traffic congestion, pollution, and safety concerns in the Beltway Corridor in Virginia.

The National Transit Data Base required by Section 15 of the Urban Mass Transit Act reported in 1997 (the latest) that it cost 46 cents per passenger-mile to move light rail passengers. This data base includes four old systems with very old small cars and/or extensive tunneling. Newer systems, without tunneling, cost 32 cents per passenger-mile. Heavy Rail Rapid Transit cost 29 cents and commuter rail 28 cents. These data further show that urban bus service costs 54 cents per passenger-mile and automated guideways (e.g., monorail) cost $3.32, or 10 times as much as light rail. Because of its high first cost, heavy rail is does not appear economical for the Beltway at this time. The lack of existing railroad tracks parallel to the Beltway and the high land acquisition costs of acquiring and constructing grade-separated, fenced dedicated right-of-way that is required for MetroRail use further precludes this option in the near future.

For a Tysons Corner-to-Springfield light rail system with a fleet of 28 cars at a cost of $478,200 per car (in year 2000 dollars) or $0.5 million per year per car for projection purposes, it is estimated that this light rail service will cost $14 million per year to operate. With 23,950 weekday passengers at the maximum load point (i.e., the number of passengers in both directions passing the most heavily patronized point on the system), a total of 28,176 weekday passengers might be expected (once other passengers not passing the maximum load point are factored in), at a cost of $1.66 per passenger. Using 251 work days annually, this will result in annual revenues from rider of $9.235 million (including 55 Saturdays, 58 Sundays, and major holiday), leaving $4.765 million (i.e., 59 cents per rider) to be made up by the federal entitlement grants, yield from increased property tax values and reduced bus costs, as well as peripheral benefits from business, professional, and gross receipts taxes. In contrast, MetroBus and the Fairfax Connector cost $2.17 and $2.58, respectively. MetroRail costs $1.81 per passenger. The Ride-On in Montgomery County cost $2.23 per passenger in 1997, while express bus on Shirley Highway-to-Springfield cost $7.97 per passenger (in 1996 dollars).

By contrast, San Diego Trolley, Inc. has the highest revenue-to-cost ratio of any purely urban transit system, at 69%. Unlike MetroRail, however, San Diego Trolley accepts free transfers from bus riders, suppressing its revenue-to-cost ratio. MetroRail in the National Capital region has achieved nearly 80%, but only after MetroBus fares have been excluded from the cost calculations. If MetroBus fares are included, the percentage drops to 52%. The National Transit Data Base indicates that the national average for all transit services is about 40%. Therefore, it is estimated that a Beltway light rail line could achieve a 70% cost recovery ratio, compared to 25% for most suburban bus services. If the revenue contribution of light rail to MetroRail were included (worth approximately $3.0 million annually), the net annual cost of light rail would be very small.

Of the total light rail transit system capital investment of $450 million, application should be made for 80% federal aid as specified by law. Current federal policy, however, is to fund highways at the full 80% but to cut transit to somewhat lesser percentage. MetroRail currently is receiving 62½% by agreement with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). At this rate, $281 million of the Beltway light rail investment from Tysons to Springfield should come from the federal government. For various reasons, FTA funds committed to light rail systems are sometimes forfeited because of funding delays, changes in local government priorities, etc. Currently, for instance, Orlando’s forfeited earmark alone would be sufficient to cover this amount. The Commonwealth should fund at least half of the remainder, or $85 million over four years at $21 million per year. The Northern Virginia Transportation Commission would have to sell bonds for the remaining $85 million) – about what the same amount as the agency sold to establish the Virginia Railway Express.

If mileage fares are applied to light rail, as they now are for MetroRail, fare revenue would be much higher than if flat rate bus-type fares are applied with full coverage of operating and maintenance costs possible. For example, it is possible to move 36 passenger-miles per light rail car-mile, with fares of 17½ cents per mile to earn $6.30 per car-mile. The cost per car-mile may be $6.25, based upon $150 per car-hour cost. San Diego Trolley cost only $101.37 per car hour in 1997 while the Sacramento light rail system cost $145.44 that year. MetroRail fares averaged 21 cents per passenger-mile in 1997. At that rate, a Beltway light rail system would earn an operating profit. In the previously described instance of the MetroRail extensions to Vienna and Springfield, the transit subsidy declined with rail service expansion, with additional fares exceeding the cost of the added rail service, thus actually saving taxpayers’ money. The Northern Virginia Transportation Commission can issue revenue bonds that can be amortized from passenger revenues and contributions from federal/sate/local tax revenue over future years.

The National Capital Region’s share of the federal TEA-21 six-year funding allocations of $36-$42 billion translates into new transit capital funding available of approximately $1½ billion. This amount could easily fund the Bethesda-Silver Spring light rail line along with the Bethesda-to-Springfield segment of the Beltway light rail line. In addition, there is discretionary transportation funding that can be designated by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation (as we have witnessed in the case of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge expansion project) for the Beltway light rail project.

With an average of 28,175 weekday light rail passengers between Tysons Corner and Springfield traveling both directions, this is the equivalent of 14,088 different individuals from (or to) the trains walking in front of the business establishments along this route each day. If an estimated 80% of these are work trips, the light rail line will be serving 11,270 jobs in the vicinity of the route. If each worker needs a minimum of 300 square feet of office space, this equates to 3.8 million square feet of office space that is served by this line. Service connecting to Maryland would approximately double this total. In addition, new businesses seeking accessibility to their offices for their employees increasingly will seek locations served by the light rail system, rather than going further out into exurbia and increasing their employees’ commute and decreasing their access to the job market and the amenities of urban life.

Clearly, all work-related trips will not be new workers employed by new businesses. At $150 per square foot to construct office space, though, the new light rail line could eventually account for $570 million worth of office space that will pay $7 million per year in local real estate taxes. Moreover, adjacent properties could be expected to increase in value as well, thus enabling payment for the new light rail line out of increased tax revenues generated by the light rail system without an increase in the County’s real estate property tax. In fact, it is expected that the taxes generated by the increase property values will more than offset the cost of subsidy to light rail and the costs to deliver County services and actually will result in decreased property taxes rates in Fairfax County. This would be consistent with the significant property tax rate reductions that accompanied MetroRail extension into Arlington and Fairfax counties that were explained earlier in this paper. A mere 6% in real estate property values will be sufficient to pay for the local Fairfax County share of the system of the system’s capital costs.

Under either alternative, the growth in taxes resulting from the increased market value of properties adjacent to the new light rail line also should enable establishment of the initial "sinking fund" for the bonds that would be issued by the Northern Virginia Transportation Commission on a basis similar to that extended to the Virginia Railway Express (VRE) when it began. Even should the property appreciation on the scale that occurred in the past on Arlington, Fairfax County, and numerous other light rail communities throughout the nation not occur, the costs to the citizens of Fairfax County will be miniscule – a cost equivalent of less than a penny over the current tax rate. The Fairfax Coalition believes that the citizens of Fairfax County would say that even that would be a small price to pay for significant relief to our Beltway traffic congestion problem.

Rail transit is much safer than bus transit as rail users suffer only half as many injuries and fatalities as urban bus transit users. Automated guideways (e.g., monorail transit) also have a higher rate of injuries because of the requirement for so many electric stairways and other means of climbing between the sidewalk and the elevated train platforms. Nationally, light rail in more congested areas that do not offer limited access rights-of-way averages only 63 collisions per 100 million passenger-miles as compared to 170 by bus on the same systems. Light rail averages 95 injuries (and very few fatalities) for every 100 million passenger-miles, compared with 184 for buses. Because of frequent stops, steps, and standing passengers, most transit injuries are of a very minor nature and cannot be compared to the more serious automobile injuries. While auto insurance companies have data, most states do not keep records on very minor automobile injuries. The light rail passenger fatality rate is 0.3 per 100 million passenger-miles, compared to 1.52 for automobile travel. For comparison’s sake, the Woodrow Wilson Bridge, alone, had 47 fatalities during the three-year period 1990-1992, or an average of 7.6 per 100 million passenger-miles.

Motor fuel consumption in the National Capital Region with its rail transit system averages 130 gallons per capita per year below the rate of consumption in other metropolitan areas lacking rail transit of significance such as Detroit, Denver (pre-rail), Houston, and Phoenix. This is saving our region 525 million gallons of motor fuel annually, worth $600 million or more per year at the pump, and considerable air pollution that would result from burning 525 million more gallons. The amount of pollution generated by the major jurisdictions in the National Capital Region is shown below:

Those jurisdictions generating the highest levels of vehicular air pollution either have heavy commuter movement coupled with low density (Frederick County) or are inner suburbs hosting traffic from outlying counties (Arlington County and Alexandria). In the case of Arlington and Alexandria, even though they have the second and third best ratio of residents to MetroRail stations (18,290 and 33,678, respectively) behind the District of Columbia with 16,850 residents per station, the volume of traffic they host from neighboring jurisdictions overwhelms the reduced pollution from Metro usage their residents can achieve.

In comparison, Fairfax County, with approximately 980,000 residents and only five MetroRail stations, averages 196,000 residents per station. Arlington County, with an estimated 2000 population of 180,000, averages 10 times the number of Metro stations per capita as Fairfax County. The two urbanized jurisdictions accounting for the least volume of vehicular caused pollution are the District of Columbia and Montgomery County. Montgomery County – the closest analogous jurisdiction to Fairfax County – has a MetroRail station for every 76,180 residents, plus 10 MARC rail stations. It also has Ride-On buses in large numbers to supplement MetroBus and to serve its MetroRail stations. Its resulting vehicular pollution is one-fourth less than Fairfax County.

[Post Script: As this white paper was being completed (April 6, 2000), a new "Purple Line Study" prepared by consultants to the Maryland Department of Public Transportation reports that the Express Bus alternative to the Purple Line would cost just as much per passenger to build as the light rail alternative, but would result in lost MetroRail ridership while attracting 33% fewer riders than light rail. Light rail would actually add 50,000-60,000 riders to MetroRail each day, or 16 million riders per year, that would reduce the MetroRail subsidy, while the Express Bus alternative adds to the MetroRail subsidy.]

1. A segmented circumferential light rail line is the only affordable solution that can address the Beltway’s traffic congestion in the near-term.
2. Light rail usually moves more people at less cost per person than other rail or bus alternatives.
3. The abundance of free or subsidized public and private parking and subsidized road systems do not produce a level playing field for public mass transit. Therefore, public transit should not be the only transportation mode required to be self-sufficient financially.
4. It is a matter of public values whether citizens and their elected officials choose to subsidize highways or mass transit.
5. If there is not sufficient density of mixed-use development at or near transit stations, light rail systems cannot operate with optimal effectiveness.
6. Design of a light rail line must be coordinated closely with land use planning in the transit corridor and adjacent communities.
7. Planning for light rail lines must be done in close consultation and ongoing involvement of the citizens and businesses affected by the proposed route.
8. Planning for a light rail corridor must be closely integrated with neighborhood and cross-county bus routes, MetroRail stations, and pedestrian and bicycle pathways and bike storage facilities.
9. The fare and route structures of the light rail system must operate seamlessly with MetroBus, Fairfax Connector buses, and MetroRail, so as not to present a barrier to system-wide transit usage.
10. Parking near light rail transit stops should be minimized and expansion of existing parking facilities should be discouraged.
11. Beyond federal and state subsidies and fare revenues, the remainder of the costs for financing the light rail system should come from the increased market value of real estate in the direct vicinity of the transit line.
12. A general increase in real estate property taxes should not be required to pay for the light rail system.
13. The Fairfax County Economic Development Authority immediately be instructed by the Board of Supervisors to assess the economic development impact of such a light rail line.
14. The Fairfax Board of Supervisors formally recommend that the rail study currently being done by the Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation (VDRPT) include a detailed analysis of the feasibility of the light rail line proposed in this White Paper.
15. Increased mass transit will enable more convenient inter-area and inter-jurisdictional access to service and technical jobs.
16. Expansion of mass transit will produce numerous direct and indirect Smart Growth benefits including lessening of sprawl, saving open space, revitalizations of inner cities and older communities served by mass transit, more effective use of existing government infrastructure, residential streets, sewer, and schools.